Pragmatic is a term that describes people who balance idealism with the need to take realistic options or courses of action into account. People who compromise their ideals and act pragmatically are often contrasted with those who refuse to do so.
Philosophers who are pragmatists have a wide range of views about how we understand truth, reality and inquiry. Many of them reject the idea that there is a fixed, objective truth that we can access by using one scientific method. Instead, they believe that reality is always changing and that the way we know it is through our actions.
The philosophical movement of pragmatism has been influenced by the work of James, Peirce and Dewey (for a history see Menand 1998). James, Peirce and Dewey all wrote about how human knowledge is always in process of becoming and that we learn through our experiences. They also rejected the idea that a concept can be fixed and argued that the meaning of concepts is determined by their use in real-world situations.
Among the most influential modern philosophers who are pragmatists is Richard Rorty, who developed a discourse ethics that sought to scaffold an authentic communicative action free of the distortions of power and ideology. He has made significant contributions to philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of religion. He also has an extensive jurisprudence practice, where he is known for his pragmatist approach to law.
In the epistemological realm, pragmatism has been a helpful framework for research that steers clear of metaphysical debates about the nature of reality and truth. It places a greater emphasis on examining the value and meaning of research data through an examination of its practical consequences (Morgan, 2014a). This stance is compatible with qualitative-dominant interpretivist understandings of socially constructed realities but provides a unique perspective for navigating complex organizational research processes.
In terms of a theory of truth, pragmatism has been influential in a number of non-correspondence theories of truth that seek to avoid the problematic assumptions inherent in correspondence theories (for examples see Goldkuhl 2012 and Maxcy 2003). However, unlike some of these other approaches neo-pragmatism does not explicitly address what it is about a statement or proposition that makes it true. This leaves open the possibility that neo-pragmatism could be considered a form of relativism. This has been criticized by some scholars, particularly Hilary Putnam who has argued that neo-pragmatism is not a viable philosophical position.